FRONTLINE COMPLIANCE
IHL in the Conduct of Hostilities
UKRAINE | OCT 2025
“IHL universalizes relations between countries, preserves humanity, and avoids genocide.”
- Weapon Bearer in Eastern Ukraine
Introduction
What makes a fighter respect the laws of war in life or death situations when facing an enemy in combat? Is International Humanitarian Law (IHL) seen as relevant in today’s battlefield and what do fighters in Ukraine think of it? How can we influence combatants to respect the laws of war?
This study explores combatants’ IHL knowledge and attitudes, pedagogical challenges in teaching IHL, combatants’ technical capacity to implement IHL on the battlefield, challenges in applying IHL theory to the realities of combat, and institutional and governmental frameworks encouraging or discouraging IHL compliance. The research aims to review and then build the evidence-base regarding the factors that explain IHL compliance in times of war.
Ultimately, the research will inform Geneva Call and other IHL practitioners’ future programming and approaches to civilian protection.
Methodology
Following previous research efforts in 2023 and 2024, Geneva Call launched this latest study to better understand what factors ensure or hinder Ukrainian combatants’ compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) during frontline military hostilities in the Russo-Ukrainian war.
As part of this latest round, Geneva Call conducted 454 surveys with active Ukrainian combatants from December 2024 to February 2025, in partnership with the Kyiv-based Center for Applied Research. (2023: 193 surveys, 2024: 343 surveys)
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In the above graphic, each square represents a combatant surveyed.
Data collection for this study was shaped by several constraints that should be taken into account when interpreting the findings. Given the operational environment, access to units and individuals was variable, and the sampling strategy was necessarily opportunistic, relying on convenience sampling rather than a randomized design. Participation was voluntary, uncompensated, and dependent on combatants’ willingness and ability to provide informed consent under demanding security conditions. As a result, the sample may not fully represent the broader population of Ukrainian combatants. In addition, the data are largely self-reported, which may introduce recall or social desirability biases. Finally, scenario-based survey questions and qualitative interviews cannot fully replicate real-time battlefield pressures. These limitations do not invalidate the findings but should be considered when assessing their generalizability and interpreting respondents’ perspectives. Additional limitations are detailed in the Disclaimers section.
Demographics
Looking across all three rounds of Geneva Call’s research, 93% of surveyed combatants were men, while 7% were women. Most combatants were between the ages of 25 and 54 years old.
Use the navigation arrows to explore the demographics of surveyed combatants.
Combat experience
A majority of respondents (69.7%) joined the armed forces after the beginning of the full-scale international armed conflict in 2022.
Among those surveyed, 58% have spent more than six months in total at the frontline since joining the military.
GC purposefully sought out combatants with substantial experience at the frontline, as they are the most likely to have encountered IHL-related situations. Moreover, 51.8% of respondents had experience commanding other soldiers for a period of at least one month.
Use the navigation arrows to explore the demographics of surveyed combatants.
IHL experience
Finally, among all respondents surveyed as part of this study, 61% had received IHL training in the past.
Key Informant Interviews
To complement the survey results, in-depth key informant interviews were conducted with Ukrainian military personnel, policymakers, legal experts, journalists, academics, and frontline civil society workers to provide qualitative insights into the factors shaping compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) and the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) on the battlefield.
Excerpts drawn from interviews with weapon bearers appear throughout the report and are marked by red squares; hover over them to better understand the reasoning underlying respondents’ answers.
Move your mouse over the red squares to view excerpts from interviews with combatants.
IHL Knowledge
When determining the factors that impact IHL compliance on the battlefield, combatants’ knowledge and understanding of the relevant norms and principles comes to mind first and foremost. Through the surveys, scenario-based test questions were posed to respondents in order to measure their level of understanding of IHL principles and how to apply them in practice.
Confidence intervals (CI) indicate the likely range where the true percentage falls (with 95% certainty).
GC’s 2024 KAP study determined that combatants knew about IHL in general terms but were less familiar with what to do in specific combat situations. This latest study aligns with those findings, while adding substantial detail. On average, only 57% of surveyed combatants managed to answer more than half of the scenario-based questions correctly.
Military experience improves knowledge
Survey results show that combatants with longer military experience tend to have greater IHL knowledge. Among those who had served three years or more, 69% answered more than half of the scenario-based questions correctly, compared to 61% of those with two years of service or less.
Click to compare Experienced vs. Newly Mobilized
While this may seem natural, it is a major area of concern because the number of combatants who have joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) since the full-scale international armed conflict in 2022 dwarfs the number of personnel who have been there for a longer period of time. In other words, IHL knowledge within the AFU has not quite kept up with its enormous growth over the last three years.
Confidence intervals (CI) indicate the likely range where the true percentage falls (with 95% certainty).
When comparing two groups, red text indicates a statistically significant difference (p < 0.05).
The commander paradox
In comparison, soldiers who report having commanded other soldiers did not perform substantially better than those who have not: 64% of commanders answered more than half of the questions correctly, compared to 60% of regular soldiers.
Click to compare Commanders vs. Regular Soldiers
Given commanders’ greater responsibilities in making targeting and tactical decisions on the battlefield, and given their roles as leaders and enforcers of codes of conduct, the fact that they do not have much greater IHL knowledge than their subordinates is an issue that should be addressed.
Confidence intervals (CI) indicate the likely range where the true percentage falls (with 95% certainty).
When comparing two groups, red text indicates a statistically significant difference (p < 0.05).
Evolution over time
In a bid to assess trends of IHL knowledge among combatants, results for some of these same test questions from GC’s 2024 KAP survey are also displayed to the right. Comparing results from 2025 and 2024 shows that knowledge gaps have not substantially been addressed over the last year, and in fact there has been a concerning decline in combatants’ understanding of command responsibility and who will be made liable if IHL is violated.
Click to compare 2024 vs. 2025
On this question, there is sometimes a clash between IHL provisions and internal military dynamics related to authority and disciplinary measures, leading to confusion as to what is the proper way to act.
Firstly, as a key informant explained, even though there is a provision in the Criminal Code of Ukraine which says that combatants are not “obliged to comply with a manifestly criminal order,” the challenge is that regular soldiers are rarely in a position to understand whether a targeting order might be illegal – they do not have access to the necessary information.
Secondly, as a Military Advisor in an INGO added, accounts from the battlefield flow from the unit commander up to his superiors via daily reports, detailing actions that were taken and any incidents that may have occurred. In other words, the commander controls the narrative, and this pushes regular soldiers to follow their orders, even if they may have doubts about those orders. Of course, such hierarchies are important for the military to maintain discipline and operate effectively, but it can complicate regular soldiers’ ability to disobey an illegal order. It is evident that IHL knowledge, therefore, is not sufficient in ensuring compliance – internal military dynamics must be in alignment with such IHL principles otherwise combatants will receive mixed messages.
Confidence intervals (CI) indicate the likely range where the true percentage falls (with 95% certainty).
When comparing two groups, red text indicates a statistically significant difference (p < 0.05).
IHL Attitudes
Another critical factor contributing to IHL compliance is combatants’ attitudes towards it, regardless of how much knowledge they might possess.
In Ukraine, there is generally positive attitudes towards IHL, and it is difficult to find individuals who completely disregard its relevance.
Confidence intervals (CI) indicate the likely range where the true percentage falls (with 95% certainty).
In-depth discussions with combatants reveal that, overall, their attitudes differ depending on the IHL principle at hand. Referring to Andrew Bell’s “Combatant’s Trilemma,” soldiers who seek to comply with IHL and protect civilians face two additional important considerations regulating their behavior on the battlefield. First, they must achieve their military objectives and take actions that give them a military advantage. Second, they must make decisions that protect their lives and the lives of their peers (“force protection”).
Perceived value and effectiveness
Only 8.6% of survey respondents said their peers attribute little to no value to IHL in general terms.
Furthermore, only 8.6% believed AFU's application of IHL on the battlefield to be ineffective.
While there is a low degree of negative attitudes towards IHL, results also show that many combatants do not view it with great enthusiasm either.
Civilian Buildings as Military Objectives
66% of combatants stated that it was not acceptable to significantly damage civilian buildings in order to gain a small military advantage, reflecting the principle of proportionality. In this context, “significantly damage” refers to causing substantial physical destruction or functional impairment to a civilian building that renders it unsafe, unusable, or unable to serve its civilian purpose.
Several interviewees described a targeting process that requires a high degree of certainty about a target’s legitimacy (principle of precaution) before engagement, a process that can take hours or even days.
Treatment of Prisoners of War
There is less enthusiasm for other IHL norms, such as the treatment of prisoners of war. This does not suggest that these principles are regularly violated, but rather reflects a perception that their application on the battlefield could expose combatants to unnecessary risks.
For example, combatants allege that Russian soldiers often fake surrenders, and are taught to fight to the death, making the detention of POWs a risky affair. Many respondents said that drones from the opposing forces regularly neutralize their own wounded soldiers so that they cannot be captured by Ukrainian combatants. Even if an opposing soldier genuinely surrenders, their detention and transfer to the appropriate authorities can put combatants in danger.
Although many combatants still comply with IHL despite the above circumstances, their own survival will often be prioritized over IHL considerations.
IHL Training
In order to increase knowledge and improve attitudes, so as to enhance compliance on the battlefield, IHL training is critical. Survey results show that combatants who received training had more knowledge and better attitudes related to IHL than combatants who had not received any training.
Confidence intervals (CI) indicate the likely range where the true percentage falls (with 95% certainty).
Impact on Commanders
For example, 51.1% of trained combatants said that the training gave them more appreciation for IHL than before.
Furthermore, 49.6% of trained combatants stated that the information they learned during IHL training impacted their decision-making on the battlefield to a high degree.
Click to compare Commanders vs. Regular Soldiers
When disaggregated by military rank, commanders stated that IHL training influenced their decision-making to a high degree more than regular soldiers. This shows that IHL training for commanders is even more relevant – because of their seniority and responsibilities – and impactful, and it can have an exponentially positive effect within the AFU as its leaders can then socialize IHL within the ranks, both formally and informally.
Impact on Knowledge
The share of combatants who answered more than half of the scenario-based questions correctly jumped from 52.4% among those without IHL training to 35% among those who had received IHL training.
Click to compare Trained vs. Untrained in IHL
Impact on Attitudes
The effect of IHL training on attitudes is much more pronounced, with statistically significant differences between trained and untrained combatants across all questions examined previously.
Click to compare Trained vs. Untrained in IHL
Addressing Training Gaps
While training improves knowledge, attitudes, and the likelihood of compliance with IHL, the reality in Ukraine today is that too many combatants have not received any.
With the backing of Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi, the Ministry of Defense provides a two-hour IHL course as part of basic training for all new conscripts, and a ten-hour course for cadets. However, there is often no time for this training, and tactical courses are instead prioritized.
As stated previously, the constant mobilization of enormous numbers of new forces requires a large investment in continuous IHL training, whether in an in-person, online, or training-of-trainers format, and thus far these needs have not been fully met.
Beyond increasing the number of trainings, the methodology used is crucial for ensuring that combatants internalize IHL principles. A classroom lecture outlining IHL norms cannot replicate the conditions soldiers face in combat.
“Teaching legal norms will not result, in itself, in a change in attitude or behavior.”
- Elizabeth Stubbins Bates (2015)
Therefore, practical, scenario-based methods, such as role-playing simulations, war gaming, vignettes, virtual reality, or video games—are more effective in building instinctive, real-time compliance with IHL.
Moreover, IHL considerations should be integrated into existing tactical trainings that already use such simulations, rather than taught as a standalone course. This approach saves time, reflects combatants’ real responsibilities, and embeds IHL into everyday military practice.
“Our training is always like kill the enemy, do this, eliminate that, take this, raid that, defend against this and then all of a sudden there's this sudden shift [with IHL training] to show compassion, and then that creates that little internal struggle in someone's psychology.”
- Ukrainian Tactical instructor
Policies and Guidance
Ukraine’s political and legal framework also dictates the degree to which combatants comply with IHL. Most IHL norms are integrated into the Criminal Code of Ukraine, as there is significant political support for IHL as a way to differentiate Ukraine from the opponent and to ensure continued Western support. In addition, the MoD’s Order 164 outlines combatants’ IHL responsibilities in broad terms, and the previously-mentioned “soldier card” lists basic principles to maintain in combat.
However, there are some gaps in translating high-level principles into concrete, practical guidance for combatants and disseminating it to them. As a NATO Advisor stated: “There is often a disconnect between this political intent, nice statements, and the reality of people having to implement them.” Operationalization of IHL rules and norms is critical, however: “Combatants should not be left to apply the law without guidance. The law should be interpreted into operationally useful rules [...] the main effort to influence the behavior of combatants has to proceed from [...] the incorporation of norms of IHL into military orders, policies and instruction.”
Legal Advisors would ordinarily be key in helping to make this happen, but several interviewees stated that many battalions do not have one, or they have not received sufficient IHL training.
Confidence intervals (CI) indicate the likely range where the true percentage falls (with 95% certainty).
Guidance
In this context, it is unsurprising that 39% of surveyed combatants said they had never received specific policies and guidance related to IHL.
Furthermore, 56% of combatants reported that their commander mentioned IHL less than once a month.
IHL Enforcement
A large part of what should make IHL policies and laws more effective is their enforcement. However, the war has strained the state’s ability to consistently investigate allegations of violations. While the MoD has established a reporting mechanism for alleged IHL violations, 48% of survey respondents indicated that, in their view, a Ukrainian combatant who committed a significant violation would be unlikely to be held accountable, or that they were unsure whether accountability would follow.
Click to compare Commanders vs. Regular Soldiers
Greater legal and military enforcement is an essential element for IHL socialization within the AFU – in a military culture guided by hierarchy and discipline, IHL will not be more substantially internalized if accountability measures for IHL violations are not strengthened. As a key informant stated, an IHL-compliant military is “characterized not by mistakes, but by reactions to mistakes.”
IHL Dissemination
When asking combatants from what sources of information they had heard of IHL before, only 27.4% said that they had ever heard of IHL from their commander, 20.3% from their military peers, and 24.5% as part of military policies and rules shared with them. 10.6% responded that they had not heard of IHL before at all.
Confidence intervals (CI) indicate the likely range where the true percentage falls (with 95% certainty).
Based on interviews, the flow of IHL information and responsibilities from the top down – from both state institutions (MoD, General Staff, Ministry of Justice) and from unit commanders – could be improved and codified substantially. Greater dissemination of IHL through training, policies, guidance, and discussions with one’s commander could socialize IHL within the ranks over time and as a consequence enhance compliance.
IHL Capacities
IHL education and socialization are not sufficient in ensuring full compliance on the battlefield. There are certain situations which require that combatants have the proper equipment, weaponry, intelligence, and technical skills to be able to follow IHL completely and effectively. And without more scenario-based training and specific guidance on how to respect IHL, gaps will remain in combatants’ ability to fully comply with IHL in all situations, even if they strongly believe in, and understand, its principles.
Confidence intervals (CI) indicate the likely range where the true percentage falls (with 95% certainty).
In its survey, GC focused primarily on three IHL norms: the principle of distinction, the principle of proportionality, and humane treatment of hors de combat individuals, including POWs. The graphic above displays the share of combatants who feel that their military unit have a high capacity to implement each norm in practice.
Combatants learn and build their capacities best in actual combat, whether with regards to IHL or any tactical skills. And with many newly-mobilized combatants being sent to the front on a constant basis, violations – even if unintentional – are a real risk because of how inexperienced these individuals are. As already mentioned, IHL education is most impactful, therefore, when it tries to simulate battlefield realities, or recreate them as best as possible through role-playing and scenario-driven trainings.
IHL Compliance
These factors – knowledge, attitudes, training, guidance, capacities – all impact the degree to which Ukrainian combatants can fully comply with IHL on the battlefield. Generally-speaking, survey results show that Ukrainian combatants have a good degree of knowledge, willingness, and ability to comply with IHL, but more can be done to enhance respect for IHL.
Including and beyond those already mentioned above, what are the factors that influence Ukrainian combatants to comply with IHL, and how prevalent are those factors? To answer this, surveyed combatants were asked to select from a list those factors that pushed them to comply with IHL.
Reasons for Compliance
The figure shows that there are a multitude of factors that impact compliance with IHL. Still, it appears that moral, reputational, and practical concerns drive combatants’ desire and ability to follow the law.
IHL dissemination must, therefore, appeal to all three of these considerations to be most impactful, by demonstrating to combatants that it is in their interest to apply IHL in order to exchange POWs, receive foreign assistance, and differentiate themselves from the opponent, for instance. Although, as stated previously, it is important to avoid moralizing at combatants without taking into account the complexities of the situations that they face – a combination of arguments, therefore, is most effective.
Reasons for Non-Compliance
With regards to factors negatively influencing IHL compliance, surveyed combatants were also asked to select from a list those factors.
While all three of these most cited factors are interrelated, they point to distinct concerns. “Stress, desperation, and exhaustion” and “revenge” point to combatants’ mental state and how the dangers of war, insufficient rest, and psychological distress can affect the decisions that they make on the battlefield.
Compliance Pressures
Indeed, 39.4% of combatants shared that the length of breaks and rotations away from the frontline are insufficient. The longer combatants are at the frontline, the more they begin to feel that the breaks they are given are not enough: only 30.7% of combatants who have spent more than 6 months at the frontline stated that these breaks were sufficient compared with 52.4% of those who had spent less than 6 months at the frontline.
Furthermore, in GC’s KAP study from 2024, only 31.9% of combatants noted that they were satisfied with the availability of psychological assistance. On paper, each battalion should have a psychologist, but this is not always the case.
“Medical data from surveys of combat troops suggest that as units sustain losses, the emotions that could lead to violations of IHL can become more pronounced.”
- DCAF (2023)
Indeed, some interviewees expressed concern that trauma can make it harder to maintain moral bearings in high-stress environments, and the longer the war endures, the more risk there is of this happening. Respondents noted that newly-mobilized combatants who are swiftly sent to the frontline may face higher risks of serious mistakes due to heightened levels of stress and limited experience: “When they encounter a potential prisoner on the battlefield, they might, out of fear that they themselves might die, not comply with the norms.”
“There is no time to think about the law in the heat of combat” identifies a different issue: combatants do not have time to evaluate which course of action is most IHL-compliant when their survival is on the line and they may only have seconds to make a decision.
“Under fire, there is no time to remember norms and conventions, you act intuitively and quickly to save your life and your comrades.”
- Ukrainian Combatant
Here it is important to differentiate between the planning of military operations and reactions in the moment when those plans break down. Commanders regularly take the time to plan military operations in advance and try to ensure that those plans are compliant with IHL, by identifying nearby civilian areas, cultural objects or medical facilities to avoid, in consultation with legal advisors. Regular soldiers, meanwhile, are more liable to find themselves in situations in which unexpected circumstances arise on the battlefield, and in which there is no possibility or time to consult a legal advisor. In both situations IHL must be respected, but the conditions in which decisions are being made can be vastly different.
“You don't think about using IHL during combat when your life is under immediate threat, when you can't think about rules or regulations.”
- Ukrainian Combatant
As previously mentioned, a classroom lecture on IHL will not be effective because it will not account for “the heat of combat.” Regular after action reviews, as well as specific guidance, are paramount to ensure combatants can quickly react in an IHL-compliant manner in these moments.
As the war evolves, the push and pull factors for compliance change and practitioners in charge of IHL dissemination must adapt. Indeed, the war in Ukraine has changed over the last year – there are more drones, and there is less experienced personnel due to battlefield losses.
“If you're a new recruit, you want to be looking to the experienced guy in your squad to tell you, okay, we'll be fine. The guy that's been shelled before, the guy that's dealt with FPVs before, the guys that, you know, that's been through multiple Russian assaults, and he looked to him for like kind of a sense of stability, a sense of, okay, he's not panicking, so I'm fine.”
- Journalist
While this applies to combat in general, it is relevant for IHL compliance as well – less seasoned leadership can lead to panic, poor judgement, and rash acts.
Conclusions and Recommendations
IHL Knowledge
Combatants display good knowledge of general IHL concepts but demonstrate gaps when it comes to reacting to more specific situational or conditional battlefield scenarios. Applying IHL norms to combat realities is therefore a significant challenge. Although commanders have greater military and leadership responsibilities, they do not display much greater IHL knowledge than infantry combatants.
- Recommendation: Prioritize IHL trainings for more senior commanders.
- Recommendation: Encourage commanders to pass on their IHL knowledge to their subordinates, monitor their behavior in relation to IHL, and include IHL components in operations’ after action reviews. IHL education should not end once combatants are sent to the front.
IHL Attitudes
Combatants have moderate attitudes towards IHL. They display a low degree of negative attitudes but many do not view it with great enthusiasm either. Combatants in Ukraine subscribe to IHL even if they perceive it as limiting their ability to fulfill military imperatives, but they tend to be more skeptical of IHL if its application is perceived to potentially put their own safety and that of their peers in danger. As a result, combatants view the principles of distinction and proportionality positively. Combatants demonstrate less enthusiasm for other IHL norms like the principle of precaution and the detention of POWs, however, because there is a perception that its application on the battlefield might require combatants to take unnecessary risks.
- Recommendation: Focus trainings on these norms that are seen less positively and emphasize that combatants do not need to take unnecessary risks to respect IHL on the battlefield. This will allow combatants to more fully embrace IHL as it will be seen as more practical and in line with battlefield realities.
- Recommendation: Deconstruct and combat specific misconceptions on IHL head on through online campaigns and educational materials.
IHL Training
As the AFU has grown significantly over the last three years and new combatants have been mobilized on a constant basis, IHL training needs have not fully been met.
- Recommendation: Disseminate IHL training through online tools to reach a wider audience, ensuring these are used and promoted by the MoD which has access to combatants and the authority to have them complete such courses.
IHL educators must not teach from a black-and-white, moral high ground that is disconnected from combatants’ lived experiences. Trainers must have the mentality that they are there to learn too – from combatants. For example, the opponent’s disregard for IHL can at times constrain Ukrainian combatants’ ability to implement humanitarian norms. With the significant increase in drone activity, it is very difficult for Ukrainian combatants to move to the frontline and back to safety, let alone to take the time and risk to detain and transfer POWs to the appropriate authorities. Finally, a distinction should be made in designing IHL-compliant battle plans and managing to respect IHL when those plans break down and there is little time to think.
- Recommendation: Train combatants on IHL using role-playing simulations, war gaming, vignettes, virtual reality, even video games, to account for these battlefield realities and create those sense memories that will enable combatants to apply IHL in practice.
- Recommendation: Keep training simple in order to promote norm internalization – account for the complexity of the battlefield but keep guidelines straightforward.
- Recommendation: Integrate IHL considerations into other, pre-existing tactical trainings that already make use of simulation exercises, rather than have it be taught as a standalone, disconnected course.
IHL Policies and Guidance
Implementation and oversight of policies, standard operating procedures, and recruitment processes has been difficult to streamline within the AFU, and this can pose a challenge to unit cohesion, learning, and standardizing expectations in many areas, including IHL compliance.
- Recommendation: Translate high-level IHL principles into concrete, practical guidance and standard operating procedures for combatants and disseminate it to them.
- Recommendation: Enforce legal and military aspects of IHL to further socialization within the AFU – in a military culture guided by hierarchy and discipline, IHL will not be substantially internalized if accountability measures for IHL violations are not strengthened.
IHL Compliance
Overall, allegations of potential violations on the Ukrainian side focus on: (i) POWs being forced to make pro-Ukrainian statements, (ii) combatants using civilian housing in frontline areas, (iii) inconsistent tracking of APMs, cluster munitions, and unexploded ordnance, (iv) irregular warnings to opposing forces before civilian infrastructure like hospitals they are occupying is struck, and (v) “finishing off” wounded opponents who are too incapacitated to surrender.
- Recommendation: Engage combatants on these specific concerns head on through online campaigns and educational materials.
Moral, reputational, and practical concerns drive combatants’ desire and ability to follow the IHL. Stress, desperation, exhaustion, feelings of revenge, and “the heat of combat” are factors that may push combatants to commit IHL violations.
- Recommendation: Promote these “push” factors and combat these “pull” factors in IHL trainings.
Weapons and technology often innovate at a faster pace than IHL guidance and regulations can.
- Recommendation: Set up policies and specialized courses regarding drones, new weapons and technological innovations emerging on the battlefield.
Access the PDF version of this abridged report here. The PDF reflects only the 2025 survey results, while this visual version includes data from 2023 through 2025.
Geneva Call is an independent international humanitarian organization, that endeavors to strengthen the respect of humanitarian norms and principles by armed groups and de facto authorities, in order to improve the protection of civilians. Geneva Call has been active in Ukraine since 2018 with scaled up operations since the beginning of the full-scale conflict in February 2022. Since then, around 200 awareness sessions for over 5000 combatants to raise their awareness and basic knowledge of the rights and obligations afforded to combatants and civilians under IHL provisions.
Disclaimers
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Sample size and interpretation:
The overall results are based on samples large enough to support meaningful conclusions. However, when data are disaggregated into smaller groups (for example, by combat experience or training background), the number of respondents in each group decreases. Findings at this level should be interpreted with caution, as some differences may reflect random variation rather than clear underlying trends. -
Participation and selection bias:
The survey includes only those combatants who were both willing and able to participate. This introduces a degree of selection bias, as respondents may differ in important ways from those who chose not to take part. -
Overrepresentation of trained participants:
Many respondents were recruited through contacts established during previous International Humanitarian Law (IHL) training sessions. As a result, the survey likely includes a higher proportion of trained participants than would be found in the broader combatant population. -
Comparisons with previous surveys:
Comparisons between the 2025 survey and GC’s earlier Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices (KAP) survey from 2024 should be seen as indicative rather than definitive. The two surveys did not include identical participant groups, so observed differences may reflect variations in sampling as well as genuine changes in attitudes or behavior over time. -
Dynamic values and filtered results:
Some figures in the report update dynamically based on selected filters. All conclusions presented in the text have been validated against the default disaggregation options provided. However, certain user-defined filter combinations may produce results that no longer align with those conclusions.